is purely private; C is thus divided between both members. Let Zi denote member i's private consumption. We shall assume in what follows that Z1 and Z2 are not observable; that is to say, though household consumption is known as a whole, we do not possess any data about its repartition between the members. Lastly, the agents make their decisions conditionally on given values of wages, w1 and w2, and nonlabor income y, so that the budget constraint is In what follows, we assume that the couple (wI, w2) belongs to a compact subset S of (]O, +oo[)2; wages are thus bounded away from zero.
The next step, in the neoclassical setting, would be to assume the existence of a (unique) household utility function, depending on L', L2, Z1, and Z2, and which is maximized subject to a budget constraint. Well known conditions can then be derived upon household behavior. We only emphasize the fact that restrictions upon labor supplies obtain in this context even though Z1 and Z2 are not observable. Indeed, a pair of Cl labor supply functions 19(wI, W2, y), i = 1, 2, will not possibly derive from the maximization of a unique utility function unless it satisfies homogeneity and the Slutsky condition: af, 2 atl a2 2 a32 aw2
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In what follows, we shall derive similar conditions upon labor supplies from an alternative, "collective" decision framework. In the "collective" setting, the household is characterized by a pair of utility functions, which we shall assume strictly monotonic, strongly quasi-concave, and continuously twice differentiable. In general, member i's utility depends on both i's and j's (j $ i) leisure and consumption: U' = U'(L', L2, Z1, Z2).
However, in the first part of the paper, we shall consider the special case of egoistic agents. An agent is said to be egoistic if his (her) utility depends only on his (her) own leisure and consumption, i.e., if The restrictions upon labor supplies will of course crucially depend upon the assumptions made about the decision process. As we mentioned in the introduction, earlier works on the subject have referred to particular concepts of cooperative game theory (in fact, essentially to Nash bargaining, though the ManserBrown (1980) paper also considers Kalai-Smorodinsky). We shall not follow this path; instead, we impose a much less restrictive condition, namely, Pareto efficiency of outcomes. That is to say, any pair of labor supply functions ({l, f2) will be considered as compatible with the collective setting if there exist two individual consumption functions, Z' and Z2, which sum up to C, such that (L', L2, Z, Z2) is Pareto efficient within the household, among all possible choices of leisure and private consumption which satisfy the budget constraint.
Two reasons can be invoked in order to advocate this choice. First, Nash bargaining is neither a realistic, nor a very convenient tool to manipulate (see Chiappori (1986) ). A second, and probably more important, reason is the impossibility of testing separately the various hypotheses which are implicit in the cooperative concept which has been chosen. In the absence of sociological data about the decision process within the household, the latter has to be considered as a "black box." But this situation is likely to generate a typical example of the so-called "Duhem problem." Suppose, for instance, that empirical evidence disconfirms the predictions of the model. Then it will be impossible to decide whether the failure must be attributed to the "collective" setting in general (as opposed, for instance, to the neoclassical one) or to the casual bargaining concept which has been used. 4 Vice versa, since the paper is aimed at providing analytic conditions which allow testing of the collective setting versus the neoclassical one, it seems necessary to limit the assumption on the decision process to some kind of minimum minimorum. The obvious candidate is of course Pareto efficiency. All cooperative concepts lead to Pareto-efficient outcomes; and it is very doubtful that a cooperative decision could be considered as "rational" in any meaningful sense, if it results in nonefficient o-utcomes.5 This leads to the following definitions (which, for simplicity, relate to demands for leisure rather than to labor supplies): 4 See, for instance, Popper (1967) . This kind of problem is commonly encountered in empirical economics (for instance, Varian (1983) invokes, as a major drawback of parametric testing, the fact that failure can always be attributed to inadequate functional forms).
5This solution-i.e., to use a very weak (hence uncontestable) version of the rationality principle, so that any empirical falsification can be attributed to the collective setting itself-follows exactly Popper's requirements (op. cit.). DEFINITION 2: Household demand for leisure (E1(w1, w, y), L2(w1, w2, y)) is said to be collectively rational for egoistic agents (CREA) if there exist two functions Z1 and Z2 and two egoistic utility functions U1(L1, Z1) and U2(L2, Z2) such that conditions (a) and (,B) above are satisfied.
Definition 2 restricts Definition 1 to the case of egoistic agents. Here, (a) is the admissibility condition, and (,3) is the Pareto efficiency requirement. An alternative formulation is that there exists, for every vector of wages and nonlabor income, some household welfare function WV which is maximized. Of course, W will in general depend not only on U1 and U2, but also on w1, w2 and y; that is to say, it is not necessarily the same welfare function which is maximized in each situation. Considering, for instance, a linear welfare function, this means that the weight of each member is allowed to depend on the wage he receives, or on the share of his labor income in total household resources. The particular case in which W depends only on U1 and U2 will be met further.
Two remarks are needed to help understanding these definitions.
(i) For any fixed (wI, w2, y), there exists a continuum L(wI, w2, y) of couples (L', L2) which are CR or CREA (in the sense defined above). This means that it is of course not possible to derive a unique couple of labor supply functions from these definitions. The derivation of labor supplies would require an additional element, namely a rule defining which of the (infinitely many) Paretooptimal couples is chosen. (This is, for instance, what the Nash-bargaining argument concerned.6
(ii) The question which will be investigated throughout the paper is the following: does, however, the Pareto efficiency requirement alone generate restrictions upon observable behavior? In other terms: take any couple of functions (Ll(wl, w2, y), L 2(w, w2, y)); under which conditions is it possible to find functions Z1, Z2, U1, and U2 such that, for every (w1, w2, y), (Ll(w1, sW2, y), L2(w1, w2, y)) c L(wI, w2, y), i.e., {L1(wI, w2, y), L2(wI, W2, y), Z1(wI, W2, y), Z2(wI, W2, y)} is one of the (infinitely many) Pareto optimal allocations? Or is it the case that any couple of labor supplies can be collectively rationalized?
C. Income-Sharing Rules
Before looking for answers to this question, let us briefly indicate a different, but equivalent, formulation of the case of egoistic agents. Suppose that the 6 A consequence is that Definitions 2 and 3 do not imply, in general homogeneity of Ll and L2. The reason is that if all prices, wages, and incomes are multiplied by the same nonnegative constant, the set of Pareto optimal outcomes does not change; but the particular outcome chosen may still vary. However, we shall, in what follows, only consider homogeneous solutions (an assumption we implicitly made when setting to one the price of the consumption good).
household is characterized by a pair of utility functions, U1(L1, Z1) and U2(L2, Z2) plus an income-sharing rule, which defines how nonlabor income is divided between members. Formally we have the following definition. Now, each member freely chooses its leisure and consumption, subject to its own budget constraint; that is, member i's program is Max U'(L', Z') (Pi) subject to Z'is yi(w, w, y)+wi(T-L').
Note that, for a given income-sharing rule, it is possible to derive a unique pair of labor supply functions; but, of course, we have no way to observe the household income-sharing rule. Also, for any G, (P1) and (P2) will generate Pareto-optimal outcome; conversely, any Pareto optimum can be considered as a solution of a program of this type for a well chosen income-sharing rule. Thus, our basic question can now be reformulated as follows. Take a pair of labor supply (or demand for leisure) functions; under'which conditions is it possible to find two utility functions Ul, U2 and a sharing rule G, such that L' is derived as a solution of (pi) (i = 1, 2) ?7
THE CASE OF EGOISTIC AGENTS
We first assume that both agents are egoistic. The conditions which arise, in this context, from the Pareto efficiency hypothesis, can be analyzed from either of two points of view. We may, first, consider labor supplies as everywhere differentiable functions of wages and nonlabor income; in that case, the conditions will generally take the form of partial differential equations or inequalities, similar to Slutsky relations. This approach is called "parametric", because, since derivatives are usually considered as nondirectly observable, empirical testing will resort to specific functional forms for direct utility (or indirect utility, or demand, or expenditure,...) functions. In that case, the restrictions will be translated into relations between the parameters that have to be estimated.
The second, "nonparametric" approach, as pioneered by Samuelson and by Afriat, Diewert, and Varian, uses a direct, revealed-preference type analysis. It derives algebraic relations about an assumed finite number of observations; no knowledge of the functional forms observed is required. In what follows, we exhibit conditions for the "collective" household decision-making model with egoistic agents successively from parametric and nonparametric viewpoints. " This formulation cannot be easily extended to the (general) case of nonegoistic agents. Indeed, (Pi) depends on Li and Zi; thus the resolution of (P,) and (P2) will give a kind of Nash equilibrium, which will generally not lead to a Pareto optimal allocation. 
A.2. Comparison with Neoclassical Conditions
The Pareto efficiency hypothesis, in the case of egoistic agents, thus results in a set of partial differential equations upon Ll and L2. These conditions are similar to, though probably more complex than, Slutsky relations, which characterize the neoclassical setting. An important point is that both sets of conditions (Slutsky on the one hand, CREA on the other hand) are totally independent. There exists neither any inclusion, nor any exclusion relationship between the classes of functions which satisfy Slutsky or CREA. Or, in other words, the fact that a given function satisfies one set of conditions does not tell anything about the other set.
This point is easily shown on the following examples. Consider, for instance, log-linear labor supply functions: This example proves, first, the absence of any inclusion or exclusion relationship between both sets of solutions. Second, it shows that, depending on the functional form adopted, CREA may lead to conditions which are more realistic than Slutsky. In the log-linear case studied here, Slutsky would imply, either (i) that each member's labor supply does not depend on the other member's wage, or (ii) that nonlabor income elasticities of labor supply are the same for both members, and the elasticity of member i's labor supply, with respect to member j's wage, is simply member j's own wage elasticity of labor supply plus one (a conclusion which is specially surprising when i is the husband and j is the wife).
Almost all empirically estimated elasticities would reject (i) as well as (ii). On the other hand, CREA holds true, for instance, if the husband's labor supply does not depend, in a significative way, on his wife's wage; this condition sounds much less unrealistic, and does not contradict too heavily the existing estimations. where W is strictly increasing and quasi-concave. First, (P') can be viewed as the maximization of a (utility) function of L1, Z', L2, Z2 under a budget constraint; hence, the solutions will satisfy Slutsky. Second, the separable form of the maximand can be interpreted in either of two ways: (i) From the neoclassical viewpoint, the household utility function is separable in L1 and Z1 on the one hand, L2 and Z2 on the other hand; thus Gorman's condition must be satisfied. (ii) From the collective viewpoint, the household is characterized by a fixed welfare function W.9 This implies, in particular, that the solutions of (P) are Pareto optimal; hence they must verify (CREA).
Thus CREA can be viewed, in a quite informal way, as "generalized separability" conditions, which restriction to functions satisfying Slutsky coincide with Gorman's condition. 9 W is fixed in the sense that it does not depend on w,, w2, and y, but only on U1 and U2: the same welfare function is maximized for all (w1, w2, y) . Here, 9 denotes the usual direct revealed preferences relation; and A, (resp. N2) the same, restricted to the (L4, Z7) (resp. to the (L, 7,c-Zi)). 
Thus (PI, P2) satisfy (CREA').
This example shows that the set of functions satisfying CREA' is not included in the set of functions satisfying SARP. The converse is less obvious, but nevertheless true, as can be seen in Example 2. 10This argument can be used directly to prove that the (CREA') is necessary. The interest of (CREA'b) is to allow an explicit construction of the utility functions. What can we say about data satisfying both neoclassical (SARP) and collective (CREA') conditions? In particular, do they stem from the maximization of a separable utility function? More generally, consider the following question (which is a straightforward generalization). It is well known that (i), (ii), and (iii) are necessary for the existence of a separable utility. Also, we do know sufficient conditions which are stronger than these (see Varian (1983)). But it is not clear (at least to me) whether (i), (ii), and (iii) are sufficient, though my conjecture is that they are not.
THE GENERAL CASE
We now release the assumption of egoistic agents, and investigate the properties of collectively rational (CR) behavior, in the sense of Definition 2. The class of CR labor supplies will clearly be very broad. It will include CREA labor supplies, as characterized in Section 3, as well as neoclassical labor supplies (take an household with two identical agents; then collective rationality amounts to the maximization of a single utility function). The question is whether it will include any labor supply at all; i.e., is collective rationality, in the more general sense, falsifiable from empirical data'? We now proceed to show that the answer is positive. Indeed, it is possible to derive a set of necessary and sufficient conditions which characterize CR labor supplies, at least from a nonparametric viewpoint; also, it can be shown from a simple counterexample that there exist data which do not satisfy those conditions. Zj, aC, c4, a f, l33), j -1 Note N) for "is directly preferred to", { for "is not directly preferred to", and suppose there exists some E such that the Q and the Sj satisfy WARP. Then contradiction is reached in four steps: STEP 1: From WARP, we have either SI I S2 or S2 1 SI. Note that the initial set {P1, P2, P3} is not affected if goods 1 and 2 are permuted. Since this permutation permutes also S1 and S2, we can, without loss of generality, assume that S1 S2: (4 -a')(-9) +(.3 -a)9 +(I -,81) (Z2-ZI)-(I -A 1)(Z2-ZI) and Ql t Q3, for (remember a>3.58 from Step 1) ax(-9)+f13(Z3-Z1) +f32(9-Z3+ Z1)j -32+ 10+9<0.
A. The Main
Thus WARP is violated by (Q1, Q2, Q), a contradiction.
C. Interpretation
A few remarks may help in understanding the results above. First, that the efficiency hypothesis by itself generates falsifiable restrictions upon household behavior is not really surprising. Basically, restrictions appear because the number of goods is greater than the number of agents in the model. This fact is known to generate restrictions in a different context, namely the characterization of aggregate demand for private goods (see, for instance, Shafer-Sonnenschein, 1982). It turns out, however, that the latter problem is closely related to the one at stake here.
The best way to understand the links between them is the following. In our model, we analyze the demand of a two agents economy for three public goods (since each good enters both utility functions), when the decisions taken are Pareto optimal. The public goods interpretation suggests consideration of the set of personal prices (marginal willingness to pay) which correspond to any Paretoefficient allocation. The only condition upon these personal prices is that, for each good, they must add-up to the market price. Now, by using the traditional duality transform, we may interpret the personal prices (resp. market prices, quantities) as individual consumptions (resp. aggregate consumption, prices) of three private goods. The adding-up constraint, in this context, only states that aggregate consumption must be the sum of individual consumptions for each good. That is to say, the initial problem has been transformed into the characterization of aggregate demand in a three-private-good, two-agent economy.11
It must however be stressed that the two problems are not totally equivalent. Within the literature on aggregate demand for private goods, it is generally assumed that the distribution of income is fixed. But such an assumption is clearly irrelevant in our context. A consequence is that the restrictions upon aggregate demand which have been established earlier (Sonnenschein (1973); Diewert (1977); Mantel (1977)) cannot be transposed to the present problem.12 They are not sufficient, since demand functions which satisfy them only "behave locally like" (i.e., have the same value and first-order derivative as) the aggregate demands of some economy; also, they ignore nonnegativity restrictions. On the other hand, these conditions are not necessary in our model, since we do not assume a fixed distribution of income. It is thus of interest to note that Proposition 3 can be viewed as providing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for this kind of problem, under the general assumptions of variable income distribution. This " The duality transform between private and public goods is well known since Samuelson (1956) . A general presentation of the properties of this transform is in Milleron (1972) . For a detailed application to the aggregate demand problem, see Chiappori (1986) .
12 Cf. the survey by Shafer and Sonnenschein (1982). might be of some interest, since no set of necessary and sufficient conditions are known so far in the aggregate demand for private goods problems. What can we say about parametric restrictions for the CR case? Almost nothing but this: such conditions (if any) would probably appear as partial differential equations. However, this would mean, informally, that the set of labor supply functions which satisfy these conditions is of measure zero-i.e., that "almost all" labor supplies would fail to be CR. Whether such a conclusion could be expected is not clear; in any case, note that it is not necessarily implied in the nonparametric case.
In conclusion, two points can be mentioned. First, an interesting test would be to compare empirically Slutsky and CREA restrictions from data upon labor supply of a set of two-member households. The two members requirement, however, prohibits the use of aggregate data; only individual data could be used for this purpose. Second, nonparametric tests could be done upon data of this kind; they would allow us to check: (i) whether the "collective" rationality requirements (in the broadest sense) are fulfilled; (ii) whether the latter collapse, either to the usual neoclassical conditions, or to conditions (CREA') (i.e., CR with egoistic agents). 
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